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Ebook Fundamental Uncertainty, Portfolio Choice, and Liquidity Preference Theory
Submitted by puput on Sat, 02/20/2010 - 02:48According to Keynes (1936) uncertainty plays a crucial role for holding liquidity, especially money. Uncertainty is understood not as risk which could be presented as a singleton probability measure on the set of events, but as fundamental uncertainty about the underlying structures, economic relationships, the inferences that could be drawn from past experience, etc. Such fundamental uncertainty arises due to the uniqueness of an event, the novelty of an economic activity or technology as well as to the lack of knowledge about the underlying economic causal relationships or the fact that knowledge is inconclusive for probabilistic inferences. Some investment decisions are unique in the sense that they are not repetitive and have no long record of experience regarding the distribution of returns. Most investment decisions incorporate a specific “new” element so that accumulated knowledge is of limited use to form expectations about future outcomes. The agent has simply no objective basis to determine reasonable probability measures. In a similar fashion also Knight (1921) called for fundamental uncertainty in the sense that the agent doubts his own probability measures since they are based on vague and subjective knowledge. It is widely discussed that this fundamental uncertainty as opposed to risk and also to ambiguity requires a new route in the theory of decision making (for example Dequech (2000a), Dequech (2000b), de Carvalho (1988), Fontana and Gerrard (2004), Rosser (2001), Wray (2006)).
Some economists claim that fundamental uncertainty is an omnipresent and unavoidable phenomenon since the economic process evolves in historical time, the unknown underlying economic structures may change over time and produce therefore a non-ergodic trajectory of data (Davidson (1987), de Carvalho (1988)). This would exclude any Bayesian rationality. It should be noted, however, that nonergodicity is not proven to be an overall empirically relevant phenomenon and that it should not be invoked as a “nihilistic” argument against any form of expectation formation (Rosser (2001)). Also Keynes’ main point was to think about how a rational agent behaves in presence of uncertainty, not to disprove any rationality. But the point is not (only) the question of non-ergodicity. It is typical that among economic agents as well as among economists there exist different and partially conflicting views about reality, and the existing empirical data does not clearly rule out most of them and does not give a clear evidence for only one point of view. Thus, beliefs are dispersed which reflects fundamental uncertainty, and it is a matter of rationality that agents will respond to this fact in some way.
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Ebook Two-sided network effects, bank interchange fees, and the allocation of fixed costs
Submitted by wulan on Tue, 11/10/2009 - 02:00Payment systems, such as credit-card networks, have features that make economic analysis particularly challenging, for regulators as well as for the theorist. In order to process a transaction between customers of different banks, the banks need to cooperate extensively. Sometimes, this means accessing each others’ facilities or customers. Cooperation may also be necessary in order to reap economies of scale. For example, central parts of the payment system will often provide services to many banks and may be jointly owned by its customers. In addition, in order to achieve optimal network effects, a fee structure that effectively taxes one type of final customers (e.g., merchants that accept card payments) in order to subsidize another category of customers (e.g., card-holders) may have to be implemented. The latter, in turn, may necessitate a multilateral pricing agreement between the banks.
In general, regulatory authorities have well-founded reasons for being suspicious of close cooperation between competitors, in particular concerning pricing decisions. Competition between independent firms will foster efficiency and tends to bring prices down to costs. In the provision of payment services, however, completely independent competition will not be a feasible alternative. The best available option may be competition at the retail level in combination with cooperation at the upstream (system) level. On the other hand, close cooperation at one level may give the banks the opportunity to cleverly design system fees and multilateral fees in such a way that downstream collusion is induced. This could, for example, be achieved by raising the appropriate marginal costs, so that incentives are created for the banks to raise final-customer prices and so that excess profits are generated elsewhere in the system. Considerations of this type has drawn the attention of regulators, resulting in a substantial amount of regulatory activity. The EU Commission, for example, forced Visa and (indirectly) Mastercard to reduce their multilateral interchange fees (see below for a discussion of interchange fees; see Bergman, 2003 and Chakravorti, 2003 for references to cases).
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Ebook On the European Commission's Green Paper: Healthy Diets and Physical Activities
Submitted by puput on Mon, 12/07/2009 - 03:15The Commission’s Green Paper on promoting Healthy Diets and Physical Activity is triggering debate on initiatives aiming at preventing obesity. The primary objective is to create conditions under which the best practices can be adopted. Unhealthy diets and lack of physical activity are the leading causes of avoidable illness and premature death, and the rising incidence of obesity is a major public health concern in the European Union.
Many factors have to be taken into account when addressing the problem of obesity. Consequently, it calls for the development of strategies entailing a multi-stakeholder approach with action being taken at local, regional, national and European levels.
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