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Ebook Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Liquidity Trap: The Japanese Experience 1999-2004

Recent developments in the Japanese economy are characterized by the concurrence of two rare phenomena: deflation and zero nominal interest rates. The year-on-year CPI inflation rate has been below zero for about six years since the second quarter of 1998 (see Figure 1). On the other hand, the uncollateralized overnight call rate has been practically zero since the Bank of Japan (BOJ) policy board made a decision on February 12, 1999 to lower it to be “as low as possible” (see Figure 2).

The concurrence of these two phenomena has revived the interest of researchers in what Keynes (1936) called a liquidity trap, and various studies have recently investigated this issue. These studies share the following two features. First, regarding diagnosis, they argue that the natural rate of interest, which is defined as the equilibrium real interest rate, is below zero in Japan, while the real overnight call rate is above zero because of deflationary expectations, and that such an interest rate gap leads to weak aggregate demand. This diagnosis was first made by Krugman (1998) and shared by Woodford (1999), Reifschneider and Williams (2000), Jung et al. (2003), and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003a, b) among others.

Ebook Budget setting autonomy and political accountability

Fiscal decentralization is a policy objective advocated by international organizations such as the World Bank (World Bank, 2000) and the OECD (OECD, 2001, 2002). Moreover, it has become a dominant trend in several countries (Epple and Nechyba, 2004).

However, the degree to which it is implemented, both on its expenditure and tax collection aspects, varies a lot. Different institutional arrangements on the sharing of competencies between central (or federal) and local (or state) governments exist (see, for instance, Ter-Minassian, 1997, and OECD, 1999).

Ebook On managerial risk-taking incentives when compensation may be hedged against

In this note we examine incentive effects of managerial compensation on managerial risk taking when that compensation can be partially hedged against. Ross (2004) performs a detailed analysis of incentive effects of nonlinear contracts on risk-averse managers when there is no possibility of hedging. In particular, he identifies three effects of the compensation form on the incentives: convexity, magnification and translation effect.

The combination of the three determines whether the manager will act more or less aggressively. That paper complements the work of Carpenter (2000), who also noted, in a dynamic setting, that convex payoffs need not increase managerial appetite for risk. Also in a dynamic model, we focus on another dimension influencing the manager’s risk preferences, namely the possibility of hedging. In particular, it is of interest to study how much higher risk-taking the possibility of hedging will induce, if at all. Most of our analysis is restricted to the case of CARA preferences, for tractability reasons, but also because it eliminates the translation effect, thereby enabling us to concentrate better on the hedging effect.

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