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Ebook Foreign banks in syndicated loan markets

Foreign bank activity has increased dramatically in recent years as barriers to foreign bank entry and activity have largely broken down. In many countries foreign banks are responsible for a large fraction of bank lending (Clarke, Cull, Peria, and Sanchez 2003). Foreign banks are particularly active in the syndicated loan markets. In our sample of twenty four European countries, a foreign bank acts as the lead arranger in about one third of all deals and participates as lead arranger together with domestic banks in another forty percent of all deals. Consequently less than one third of all deals are domestically arranged without at least one foreign lead arranger. Moreover, foreign bank underwriting of syndicated loans is found throughout the European markets, in small countries as well as the largest countries with the most sophisticated domestic financial systems. Our objective is to gain an understanding of why the share of foreign banks in syndicated loan markets is so high. Our motivation is that the standard explanations in the literature for foreign bank activity are not always consistent with the levels and patterns of foreign bank participation in syndicated loan markets.

The syndicated loan market provides a good laboratory to examine foreign banking activity because it is large and has many cross border features. In this market firms can go to either domestic or foreign banks (or a consortium of both) that will syndicate a loan to buyers in any market. We will use detailed data on syndicated loans, including interest rates, from Dealscan. We match the loan data with information about the borrowing firms from Amadeus. Thus, our data set includes detailed information on lenders and borrowers throughout Europe for the period 1995 - 2007. Furthermore, by focusing on Europe, we have a sample of many countries with both large and small financial markets.

Free ebook An improved scheme for detection and labeling in Johansson displays

Consider a number of moving points, where each point is attached to a joint of the human body and projected onto an image plane. Johannson showed that humans can effortlessly detect and recognize the presence of other humans from such displays. This is true even when some of the body points are missing (e.g. because of occlusion) and unrelated clutter points are added to the display. We are interested in replicating this ability in a machine. To this end, we present a labeling and detection scheme in a probabilistic framework.

Ebook Number of Sellers, Average Prices, and Price Dispersion

It has been shown theoretically that price dispersion can result under a variety of different circumstances. Some suggest that dispersion arises as a simple extension of standard monopolistic competition. Others adopt a search-theoretic framework that suggests price dispersion is generated when some consumers do not know the location of a low price. Both approaches are widely accepted, yet their predictions sometimes diverge concerning the correlation between the number of sellers in a market and the moments of the resulting equilibrium distribution of prices.

Intuition might suggest that in markets more densely populated with buyers, the resulting higher number of sellers would be associated with a “more competitive” market, characterized by lower prices and less price dispersion. These associations do appear in modifications of the standard models of monopolistic competition that allow for price variation across sellers. However, this is not necessarily the case for models that adopt the search theoretic approach to price dispersion. For instance, Rosenthal (1980) finds conditions under which “increasing the number of sellers … induces [an increase] in the sellers’ … equilibrium [price] distribution” (p.1579). If markets with fewer sellers have higher search costs, then Samuelson and Zhang (1992) develop a model in which “as search costs increase, prices and price dispersion may decrease” (p.55). Lest one thinks that such models are isolated and special cases, consider the well-known paper by Stiglitz (1987) whose very title “Are Duopolies More Competitive than Atomistic Markets?” highlights the potential for “counter-intuitive” results, namely that markets with a larger number of competitors may have higher prices, with the result depending on assumptions regarding search costs.

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