Labor is one of the most heterogeneous products traded in a modern economy. The competitive market for a commodity, where all units are interchangeable and all trade for the same price, could hardly be a worse description of the labor market. No Walrasian auctioneer determines the wage. We study survey evidence on the ways that an employer and a worker determine the wage at the outset of their relationship. Our findings support the predictions of theories of wage determination about the relationship among the level and dispersion of wages, on the one hand, and the incidence of bargaining, on the other hand.
The extensive literature on this topic considers two main cases. The first is wage posting. Here an employer defines a job in terms of duties and qualifications, and commits to a wage. If a candidate is found qualified and interested, the employer offers the wage on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The second is bargaining. The employer makes an initial offer, but the candidate can make a counteroffer for a higher wage, if so inclined. A key difference between the two modes is the employer’s commitment not to entertain a counteroffer. To the employer, the advantage of posted wages is that the employer may appropriate a large fraction of the surplus of a match. The disadvantage is that a posted wage precludes a match with a candidate whose reservation wage is higher than the posted wage but whose productivity is even higher. Bargaining with this worker would have gained some of the surplus. Bargaining is in the interest of the employer if qualified workers have heterogeneous skill levels.