Sovereign debt crises in emerging markets are usually associated with liquidity and banking crises. The conventional view is that such domestic financial turmoil is caused by foreign retaliation, as trade sanctions or exclusion from international financial markets. Yet, this interpretation is controversial. First, there is no clear-cut empirical evidence supporting the application of “classic” penalties. Second, in recent sovereign crises (e.g. Argentina 2001 and Russia 1998) government default had a direct “balance-sheet” effect on domestic financial institutions, since a large fraction of public debt was held domestically (see Mishkin (2006)). In this paper, I study the connection between sovereign defaults and liquidity crises in absence of external penalties.
The model builds on two natural assumptions for emerging markets. First, public debt represents a source of liquidity for the private sector. Indeed, limited enforcement restricts the access to spot credit markets and induces firms to save in government bonds (either directly or indirectly through the banking sector) as a financial buffer that can be drawn in case of unexpected investment opportunities. This is consistent with the negative correlation between creditor rights protection and banks’ holdings of government debt observed in the data. Second, the government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign bond holders in the event of default. This assumption, which stems from the increasing integration of domestic financial markets, is consistent with the large haircuts suffered by domestic financial institutions on their government debt holdings observed in recent debt crises.