A major issue currently facing the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is its regulation of securities market structure. Recently, the SEC issued proposed Regulation NMS, in which it observes that the historical divisions between traditional auction exchanges (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”)) and dealer markets (e.g., the “old” Nasdaq) are eroding as new forms of competition from automated quote driven market centers emerge (e.g., Archipelago, Inet ATS). In its release, the Commission acknowledges that “the intensified competition … has benefited investors by reducing trading costs and prompting better, more efficient services,” but also goes on to state that “the objective of market center competition can be difficult to reconcile with the objective of investor order interaction.” In short, the SEC is grappling with the issue of whether investors are better served by competition among market centers that may fragment order flow and reduce liquidity, or by consolidation of order flow in a centralized market that may enhance liquidity but reduce competition among market centers.
This paper attempts to contribute to the controversy over securities market structure by examining the comparative performance of the NYSE and Nasdaq during times of recent market stress. Many studies have compared the performance of the two marketplaces generally, but few have examined their comparative performance under stress, which we define as information shocks that result in rapid stock price movements and high trading volume. One exception is the 1988 Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms (i.e., “the Brady Report”), which found that the NYSE performed relatively better than Nasdaq during the 1987 stock market crash. In a recent report on securities market structure, the NYSE referred to the Brady Report to support its view that “to a large extent, the NYSE is the market most looked to during periods of market distress.”
This article contain:
Major outbreaks of animal disease, and the control policies which are used to contain them, have widespread adverse implications for many people beyond the obvious and direct effects on animal health, welfare and productivity. This was reflected in the response to our consultation. Similarly some animal infections pose a risk to human health and the environment. These can lead to food safety risks and scares, food shortages, adverse effects on the rural economy, and destabilisation of markets or trade restrictions.
This outline strategy deals most fully with farm livestock health and welfare, although it sets out the principles of partnership working and the reasons for Government intervention more widely.
