The lack of adequate mental healthcare is a pattern that exists throughout the world; not even one single country meets its mental health needs. This is especially true during disasters, when there is an increased demand for mental health services and a concurrent deterioration of mental healthcare capacity. Mental healthcare is particularly important during disasters because such events can cause fear in addition to the physical injuries among affected people. Disasters also result in long lasting psychological consequences due to the disruption of social networks and loss of property.
For a mental health intervention to be effective, it is important to take into consideration the local socio-cultural setting, requirements, problems, and the perception within the community of those requirements and problems. A balance should be maintained between individual mental health services and community focused interventions. The psychological impact of large scale disasters, particularly in urban areas, affects not only the victims but the general population as well. September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were unprecedented. Thousands of people in New York watched the actual event unfold, and millions around the world watched it on televisions. This single event impacted people throughout the world.
We demonstrate that in the absence of debt covenants and agency costs, optimal debt maturity is a monotonic function of leverage. However, debt is often issued with restrictive covenants in order to reduce debt-equity agency costs. Utilising covenants in this way introduces owner-manager agency costs that results in shorter term debt than would otherwise be optimal. In the presence of debt-covenants, agency costs drive a concave functional relationship between maturity and leverage. This concave relationship is empirically confirmed with a large sample of industrial firms for the period 1992-2005. We also show that the alignment of managers and owners interests, as proxied by future levels of managerial ownership and executive stock options, significantly reduces the effect of manager-owner agency costs on maturity decisions. These insights provide a sound explanation for a variety of competing empirical observations in the capital structure and corporate governance literature.
Once a firm’s managers decide to issue debt, they must determine a suitable maturity for the debt issue. Owners and managers have a strong incentive to choose a maturity that minimizes the cost of debt in order to maximise firm value. One method of reducing the cost of debt is to incorporate debt covenants with the debt issue. Debt costs are reduced by incorporating covenants because debt holders are able to mitigate the agency costs arising from debt-equity conflicts. However restrictive debt covenants introduce an alternative agency cost arising from owner-manager conflicts. Restrictive debt covenants increase the likelihood of managers losing control of the firm (Chava and Roberts, 2008; Ozelge, 2007), so managers have a stronger incentive to minimize the probability of covenant violation than to lower the cost of debt. We investigate the role played by the trade off between the competing agency costs in debt maturity decisions.
This document describes the Kyocera 2135 trimode phone, with CDMA digital service at 800 MHz and 1900 MHz, and analog service at 800 MHz; and the Kyocera 2119 single-mode phone, with CDMA digital service at 1900 MHz.
