The fall of the Soviet Union initiated an era of unparalleled political and economic reform given the breadth, depth and speed of the changes. The shift towards democracy and capitalism entailed greater personal freedom of thought, expression and lifestyles. The dismantling of the command economy allowed competition to flourish, thus improving productivity of the individual as well as the firm. Overall, individual well?being should have been enhanced through increased freedom and economic resources. However, in Russia and many other countries that underwent market reform, the transition was accompanied by economic crisis, which decreased well?being through material hardship and insecurity. Populations that had never dealt with extreme social risk suddenly found themselves unemployed, unpaid or unable to cope with inflation, while lacking a sufficient safety net and watching the “winners” of the transition achieve unprecedented wealth.

Undoubtedly, these complicated transformations greatly influenced demographic decisions, including whether and when a child was desired. Indeed, while the majority of men and women had two children in Russia before 1990, fertility fell to below 1.2 children per woman by the end of the 1990s (Zhakarov and Ivanova 1996). Research on this dramatic decline has shown very little relevance of postponement to the majority of this fertility decline, nor does it appear due to increasing childlessness rates; the decline seems to be due to stopping behavior in which second and higher order births declined (Sobotka 2002).