Extant literature in earnings management proposes different theories for why firms manage earnings. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argue that managers alter reported accounting numbers to maximize their bonus, avoid tripping debt-covenants written on accounting numbers or to reduce their firm’s political visibility. Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) survey Chief Financial Officers who indicate they manage earnings to maintain or increase the stock price of their firms. A vast literature (see Fields, Lys and Vincent 2001 for references) has validated the Watts and Zimmerman (1978) propositions. However, managerial incentives to manage earnings to address stock price concerns are relatively under-explored. In this paper, we build on the stock price motivation by proposing a hitherto unexamined incentive for why managers manage earnings.
We argue that, for psychological or institutional reasons, investor demand for stocks that report positive earnings surprises is time-varying, which, in turn, causes the relative aggregate market value of stocks with and without positive earnings surprises to fluctuate. Limits to arbitrage, presumably, fail to prevent this demand from affecting relative prices of stocks with and without positive earnings surprises. To increase, or at least maintain, their current stock price levels, managers cater to the investor demand for positive earnings surprises by increasing abnormal accruals in periods when investors place a premium on positive earnings surprises, and vice-versa.