Credit constraints have been known to be a part of corporate reality for decades (Hubbard, 1998, and references therein). Massively reduced access to credit has been a feature of the major financial crisis of recent years. It is also well known that firms are subject to substantial market risk – whether on the demand side or supply side. Incorporating corporate finance aspects into an industrial organization model of the vertical supply chain, we study the interaction between credit constraints and market risk, and their effects on short-run retail pricing, long-run investment, and welfare. We show that credit constraints and market risk impact optimal vertical contracting, creating scope for double marginalization, slotting fees, finance arms, and outsourcing. Further, we identify a new monetary transmission mechanism from interest rates to the real economy which acts via firms which are at risk of becoming credit constrained. Finally, the model gives rise to a novel theory of countervailing power based on credit constraints.
Consider a vertical supply chain consisting of a single upstream firm (“he”) supplying a single downstream firm (“she”), and exposed to demand-side risk. The joint-profit maximizing supply contract would involve per unit input prices at the upstream firm’s marginal cost, irrespective of any demand-side risk. But now suppose the downstream firm has some future investment opportunities. The size of the loan she is able to raise to fund the investment, and therefore the actual investment level, depend on the size of the pledgable assets the firm owns. Under the standard assumption that investment is subject to diminishing marginal returns, we show that the profit maximizing firm becomes endogenously risk averse when accumulating pledgable assets. When pledgable assets are low, the induced investment level is low as well. This implies that the return on a marginal dollar of investment would be high, and so an extra marginal dollar of pledgable assets can be greatly levered through the banking sector.