Information problems have long been at the fore of analyses of credit markets. Indeed, one rationale for banks is as institutions to gather information and establish relationships with borrowers in an effort to surmount these problems. A striking feature of banks is the plethora of services that they offer and the economies of scope between them. For example, accounts and payments’ services provide valuable data to the bank on the creditworthiness of clients as potential borrower.
A limited number of papers have focused on whether banks should share information. Jappelli and Pagano (1993), in a model with adverse selection, show that exchanging information on borrower type decreases default rates and reduces average interest rates. In a related paper, Padilla and Pagano (1997) show that information sharing among borrowers would lead to lower interest rates and increased lending. There is also a growing body of empirical evidence that suggests that the existence of credit information sharing is associated with deeper credit markets. Barron and Staten (2003), Kalberg and Udell (2003) and Cowan and de Gregorio (2003) all suggest there is value in the existence of private credit bureau reporting services.