Interbank markets are among the most important in the financial system. They allow liquidity to be readily transferred from banks with a surplus to banks with a deficit. They are the focus of central banks’ implementation of monetary policy and have a significant effect on the whole economy. Under normal circumstances the interbank markets, especially the short term ones, work rather well. On occasion, however, such as in the crisis that started in the summer of 2007, interbank markets stop functioning well inducing central banks to intervene massively in order to try to restore normal conditions.
Despite their apparent importance, interbank markets have received relatively little attention in the academic literature. The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple theoretical framework for analyzing interbank markets and how the central bank should intervene. Our analysis is based on a standard banking model developed in Allen and Gale (2004a, 2004b) and Allen and Carletti (2006, 2008). There are two periods in the usual way. Banks can hold one-period liquid assets or two-period long term assets with a higher return. All assets are risk free in the sense that their promised payoffs are always paid. Banks face uncertain liquidity demands from their customers at the end of the first period. We distinguish between two types of uncertainty concerning banks’ liquidity needs. The first is idiosyncratic uncertainty that arises from the fact that for any given level of aggregate demand for liquidity there is uncertainty about which banks will face the demand. The basic role of interbank markets is to allow reallocations of liquidity from banks with an excess to banks with a deficit. The second is the aggregate uncertainty that is due to the fact that the overall level of the demand for liquidity that banks face is stochastic.