Since Kydland and Prescott (1977)’s advocacy for rules rather than discretion, there has been a lot of debate about how much we should tie the hands of the policymaker in order to reduce or eliminate time-inconsistency problems. In this paper we study the time inconsistency problem of government debt. As earlier literature illustrates, governments are tempted to default on and to devaluate (through the manipulation of the interest rate) their debt obligations. Moreover, the higher is the level of government debt the larger the government’s temptation. Is then desirable to impose an institutional constraint on the amount of government debt?
Many countries have recently adopted limits on government debt. There are two main arguments in favor, namely, these debt limits may lessen time-inconsistency problems; and they may help prevent excessive government spending. The main argument against is that they may reduce the flexibility of the government in response to shocks. This paper attempts to isolate the effect of debt limits on the time-inconsistency problem of government debt.
LixNi0.5Mn0.5O2 and LixNi1/3Mn1/3Co1/3O2 are cathode materials in Li-ion batteries. The changes in their electronic structure during charging/discharging processes were studied by using electron energy loss spectrometry (EELS) in a transmission electron microscope (TEM) and first-principles calculations. Significant growth was observed at O K-edge upon the removal of lithium, indicating a depletion of O 2p electrons.
What is the effect of political regimes from democracies to dictatorships on the economy? This is a key policy question that has received attention from researchers in economics in the past 10 years. We may believe in, and hope for, a positive relationship between economic growth, or GDP levels, and democratization. On the other hand, military dictatorships have to deliver benefits to the people in order to continue in power, and higher economic growth may be one way of achieving this.
To summarize the findings till now, Barro (1996) and Rodrik (1997) find no impact of democracy on economic growth. These results are in line with the study of Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) who find no differences in long-term growth between democratic and autocratic regimes. Almeida and Ferreira (2002) show that the variance of growth rates is significantly higher in societies under autocracy than in societies under democracy. Focusing on the dynamic effects of democracy, Minier (1998), Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) find a positive effect of democratization on economic growth. More recently, Persson and Tabellini (2006) show that democracies need to be consolidated in order to stimulate growth.
