Traditional models of market power (Bresnahan, 1999) assume that the degree of market power can accurately be assessed from models where either price or quantity competition are the only endogenous variables. One of the conclusions of this literature is that significant market power, in the sense of price costs margins, exists in some concentrated industries. In this paper a structural model is specified and estimated which accounts for competition in two variables: capacity and prices.
Recently, more emphasis has been placed on the interactions between product market competition and other "input" markets, such as R&D, advertisement, finance, labor, and capacity. By endogenizing such input markets, which is often done by using a two-stage set-up, a number of fundamental issues need to be reconsidered. Of particular interest is the effect of imperfect product market competition on the demand for inputs. Another issue is that of endogenous costs and market structure (Sutton, 1991). A third area is anti-trust, where conventional wisdom of competition policy may not hold, once another strategic variable is introduced (Fershtman and Gandal, 1994).