Monetary economists have frequently expressed the view that the financial system is an important source of and propagation mechanism for cyclical fluctuations. Indeed, Keynes (1936), Simons (1948), Friedman (1960) and many others have argued that the free and unregulated operation of financial markets can lead to indeterminacy of equilibrium and "excessive economic fluctuations," even in the absence of shocks impinging on the rest of the economy. In modern terms, this argument claims that the financial system itself is a source of endogenously arising economic volatility.
This view has a long empirical foundation. Most of the pre-World War II recessions were associated with substantial transfers of resources out of the banking system and into other assets. For instance, most of the pre-World War II recessions described by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) were associated with increases in the currency-deposit ratio. Particularly severe recessions were associated with particularly sharp increases in this ratio (that is, with bank panics). And even in the last three decades, several recessions have been accompanied by phenomena termed "disintermediation" or "credit crunches." In all of these episodes the volume of bank-extended credit declined, and "credit crunches" have often been associated with the increased incidence of non-price rationing of credit.