Extensive prior research suggests that the announcement of a loan agreement produces positive abnormal returns for the borrowing firm. The specialization, monitoring, screening, and certification functions associated with lending relationships may contribute to these positive abnormal returns. The informational benefits that are associated with relationship banking, and that underlay the positive abnormal returns, presumably exceed any “holdup” costs potentially associated with relationship banking (Boot (2000). These positive abnormal returns may also stem from the contractual flexibility of bank lending that supplements the monitoring function performed by the lender (Preece and Mullineaux, 1996).
In recent years, however, there has been increasing evidence and discussion of the changing nature of bank intermediation and the value of bank relationships. Boot (2000) points out that the proliferation of direct funding available to firms in the financial markets has started to “seriously challenge banks’ future as relationship bankers.” When investment banks underwrite public issues, they encounter credit risk and the risk involved in placing the securities, moving their role much closer to that of a traditional bank involved in lending and placing syndicated loans. A recent article in the financial press described how banks are acting less like lenders and more like middle-men between borrowers and investors, i.e., the banks are acting more like bond markets. These trends suggest that the traditional market reaction to news of a bank loan may also have changed. Virtually all of the research in the extensive literature on loan announcements uses samples that include the 1970s, 1980s, and in a few cases the early 1990s. By combining the earlier sample periods with more recent data, our paper seeks to determine how the well-established loan announcement reaction has survived the changes in traditional bank lending relationships.