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Does fiscal decentralization lead to more efficient governance, better public goods, and higher economic growth? This paper tests hypotheses posed by theoretical literature that the results of decentralization depend on features of political institutions. Using data from up to 95 countries for 25 years, we show that the effect of decentralization on economic growth, quality of government, and public goods provision strongly depends on two aspects of political centralization: 1) strength of national party system (measured by the age of the main parties and fractionalization of the government parties) and 2) subordination (whether local and state executives are appointed or elected). We find solid support for Riker’s theory (1964) in developing countries: Strong parties significantly improve the results of fiscal decentralization in terms of economic growth, quality of government, and public goods provision. There is also some evidence that subordination of local to higher-level governments improves the effect of decentralization on growth and public goods provision (in developed and developing countries) and government quality (in developing countries).
Modern economic literature has little doubt that economic decentralization affects the quality of government, economic growth, and efficiency of public goods provision. The effect of decentralization depends on political and economic incentives of local public officials. Economic incentives that help to align politicians’ private interests with public goals are provided by such mechanisms as interjurisdictional competition (Tiebout, 1956; Qian and Roland, 1998; Maskin, Qian, and Xu, 1999) and fiscal autonomy (Jin et al., 1999; Qian and Weingast, 1997; and Zhuravskaya, 2000). Political incentives, i.e., local governments’ accountability, are provided by political institutions which ensure that careers of local politicians depend on whether they pursue efficient policies. In the absence of accountability, strong economic incentives at the local level may result in corruption, provincial protectionism, and capture by vested interests (Tanzi, 1996; Sonin, 2003).
Recent studies on the health consequences of obesity have shown that overeating may be as dangerous as smoking in terms of life expectancy (Sturm and Wells). Abuse of alcohol, cigarettes and/or fa(s)t food increases loss of human lives and health care costs. This raises the question of the best policy response through alternative instruments such as taxation, liability, information campaigns (health-warnings) or advertising restrictions. These policies are designed to decrease consumption, either by influencing prices, raising consumer awareness or limiting access to products. For instance, liability payments have been imposed due to the lack of information about health-risks provided by tobacco companies to consumers (Bulow and Klemperer). The US fast-food industry faces similar lawsuits for misleading advertising or absence of information about risks as we describe in the next section.
This article analyzes the complex interaction between liability, information about risks and consumer demand. Specifically, we seek to answer the question: should regulators or courts rely on health-labeling or on tort law for regulating and limiting “dangerous consumption”? This question is important since recent legal attempts to hold the US fast-food industry responsible for obesity are likely to extend to that part of the agri-business sector that produces high energy foods. To address this question, we adopt a normative approach that could provide some guidelines for regulators and/or courts.
In 1987, the late Jonathan Mann, then director of the WHO Global Programme on AIDS, identified three phases of the HIV/AIDS epidemic: the epidemic of HIV, the epidemic of AIDS, and the epidemic of stigma, discrimination, and denial. He noted that the third phase is “as central to the global AIDS challenge as the disease itself” (Mann 1987). Despite international efforts to tackle HIV/AIDS since then, stigma and discrimination (S&D) remain among the most poorly understood aspects of the epidemic. As recently as 2000, Peter Piot, executive director of UNAIDS, identified stigma as a “continuing challenge” that prevents concerted action at community, national, and global levels (Piot 2000).
This poor understanding is due in part to the complexity and diversity of S&D, but also in part to limitations in current thinking within the field and the inadequacy of available theoretical and methodological tools (USAID 2000). The purpose of this paper is to propose a new conceptual framework to help inform thinking about the processes of S&D, about the way these processes relate to HIV/AIDS, and about potential interventions to address S&D and minimize their impact.
