This paper explores the effect of minimum wages on firms incentives to provide training for their employees. Our point of departure is a well-known paper by Acemoglu (1997), which argues that a more compressed structure of wages - such as is found in many European countries - gives firms more incentive to train. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999, 2003) view minimum wages as a source of wage compression and show that a rise in the minimum wage stimulates firm training. This result seems simple and compelling: When a minimum wage constraint is binding, a rise in training will increase the productivity of a firm’s workforce, but it will not lead to a rise in the wage. Thus training is more profitable under a minimum wage constraint than in the absence of this constraint, for in the latter case the rise in productivity will lead to a wage hike. It is on this account that minimum wages are conducive to training.
This paper considers another potentially important channel whereby minimum wages affect firm training: A rise in the minimum wage reduces the profitability of an employee, thereby making it more likely that the firm will fire the employee. In that case, however, the firm cannot appropriate the gains from training, and thus the firm will provide less of this training.