New-Keynesian (NK) models have been extensively used in recent years to analyze the impact of monetary policy on business cycle fluctuations and to provide guidelines in the design of optimal monetary policy rules.
NK literature commonly disregards potential strategic interaction between policy makers and large wage setters. Yet, collective wage bargaining is a distinctive feature of labor markets in most of OECD countries. In addition, countries differ in terms of centralization of the wage bargaining process, ranging from completely decentralized, such as the US and the UK, to highly centralized, such as Norway. In centralized countries, negotiations are delegated to few large unions, whose decisions affect the aggregate level of wages, which is turn one of the main forces driving the real cost of labor and, as consequence, inflation. In such an environment, strategic interaction is an issue: a rise in the bargained wage calls for policy action on the part of the central bank, as long as the objective of price stability is at risk.