Credit rationing, once a major issue of debate in the literature on banking, has moved out of the spotlight since the mid-1990s. If interest in the matter has waned, it is not because inquiry reached an analytical dead end or, on the contrary, achieved definitive results. Although the numerous attempts made in the 1960s and 1970s to explain positive excesses in credit demand at the equilibrium interest rate proved unfruitful, at the turn of the 1980s the fundamental works of Keeton (1979, ch. 3) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) provided a rigorous, if restrictive, justification of ,a href="http://www.acrobatplanet.com/non-fictions-ebook/ebook-financial-constraints-and-unemployment-equilibrium.html">equilibrium credit rationing in the presence of ex ante asymmetries of information between a lending bank and a subset of borrowers with projects entailing different but, for the bank, indistinguishable degrees of risk.