Although the importance of press releases as part of a firm’s disclosure strategy is widely accepted (Lang and Lundholm 2000; Bushman and Smith 2001; Francis et al. 2002), academic research on this area has been limited. Press releases are easily accessible by the public and represent an important instrument for managers to communicate firm performance. However, through them, managers can influence the perceptions of third parties for their own benefit (Bowen et al. 2005). Oftentimes, managers provide self-serving disclosures that cast their performance in a positive light or that blame poor performance on temporary external factors (Barton & Mercer, 2005). In this paper, we analyse the role of internal corporate governance mechanisms in limiting self-serving disclosure practices by management in press releases.
Extant research provides mounting evidence of the monitoring and disciplining role of governance mechanisms, and highlights the role of boards of directors in facilitating and improving the control exerted over senior managers, ensuring that management acts in the interests of investors. Prior academic work confirms that efficient governance mechanisms limit earnings management practices (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1996; Peasnell, Pope & Young, 2005) demand more conservative accounting (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007) and increase voluntary disclosure in annual reports (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Lim, Matolcsy & Chow, 2007). However, while there is general agreement that governance influences accounting information quality, there is limited evidence on its association with voluntary disclosure practices, and no previous evidence on whether these mechanisms can influence impression management practices in narrative disclosures.