The intention of this report is to describe and analyze the features of the lending system of the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP), established recently. A number of problems with said system are discussed. In addition, through the analysis of the VBSP lending system, suggestions for improvements are offered.
The basic mission of the VBSP is to provide low interest and accessible financial services to the residents and rural communities that have been left behind during the steady growth of the Vietnamese economy in recent years, in an attempt to narrow the gap that has emerged and to alleviate poverty. Whilst these objectives are essentially appropriate, the financial services provided by the bank all represent so called “subsidized credit”, which inevitably gives rise to doubts concerning the sustainability of its system. In addition, the compounding of industrial policy objectives, the integration of risk alleviating measures within the lending program, and the involvement of the politics, arouse another problems. Inevitably, the characteristics of financial services provided by the VBSP are complex by nature. This report aims to clarify the issues involved and to seek specific measures that may contribute to improving the modus operandi of the VBSP.
I study firms' behaviour in markets where firms' long-run capacity decisions, made in the presence of uncertain demand, constrains short-run competition. In Chapter 2, I analyse firms' investment and pricing incentives in a differentiated products framework with uncertain demand. Firms choose production capacities before observing demand and choose prices after demand is realised. Unlike previous models, when firms are identical, symmetric pure-strategy equilibria exist, even in the presence of very low capacity costs.
We use the principal-agent model as a focal theoretical frame for synthesizing what we know both theoretically and empirically about the design and dynamics of the implementation of performance management systems in the public sector. In this context, we review the growing body of evidence about how performance measurement and incentive systems function in practice and how individuals and organizations respond and adapt to them over time, drawing primarily on examples from performance measurement systems in public education and social welfare programs. We also describe a dynamic framework for performance measurement systems that takes into account strategic behavior of individuals over time, learning about production functions and individual responses, accountability pressures, and the use of information about the relationship of measured performance to value-added. Implications are discussed and recommendations derived for improving public sector performance measurement systems.
The use of formal performance measures based on explicit and objectively defined criteria and metrics has long been a fundamental component of both public and private sector incentive systems. The typical early performance measurement system was based largely on scientific management principles (Taylor, 1911) promoting the careful analysis of workers’ effort, tasks, work arrangements and output, establishing work procedures according to a technical logic, and setting standards and production controls to maximize efficiency. Assuming the benchmark level of performance reflected the relationship between worker effort and output, workers could be paid according to a simple formula that included a base wage per hour plus a bonus rate for performance above the standard.
