Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, many developing countries have struggled to service their external debts to both commercial banks and industrial countries’ governments. While there is a general consensus on the idea that the adoption of an IMF programme may act as a “green light” for private loans, this paper provides a first test for the existence of an empirical relationship between the adoption of a Fund programme and the concession of a debt rescheduling by private creditors.
In the early 80s Paris Club creditors provided reschedulings for low-income countries on non-concessional terms and on market-related interest rates. In the late eighties (1989-94) the Brady deals addressed commercial bank lending to sovereign debtors (generally middle-income countries) and involved a combination of an IMF agreement and debt-service reduction and rescheduling from commercial banks. In the same period, Paris Club creditors agreed to provide low-income countries with concessional reschedulings, conditional on the adoption of an IMF adjustment programme, under the Toronto (1988), Trinidad (1990), Naples terms (1994) and, more recently, the World Bank and the IMF have implemented the HIPCs Debt Initiative (1996). At the end of the 90s the Fund has been involved in the East Asian financial crisis. It still seems the case that the acceptance of a Fund agreement acts as a signal of the country’s intentions which reassures the market and in turn makes commercial creditors more willing to accord rescheduling of a country’s debt.