A central issue in limited contract enforceability is that if the identity of a defaulting party is forgotten, then it can reenter the market with a fresh start. The acts of countries and major banks, however, are remembered, thus they cannot simply walk away after breaking their commitments. This implies that one can view sovereign bank lending as a long-term relationship (to use the terminology of Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002, a relational contract) between borrowers and lenders. In such contracts, parties honor their obligations in order to influence the terms of future interactions.
This can mean that a default or any other form of misbehavior leads to an increase in borrowing costs or, as an extreme form, a capital market exclusion. As shown by Kletzer and Wright (2000), Wright (2002), and Kovrijnyikh and Szentes (2007), such punishments are fully compatible with competitive markets, due to the repeated lender interactions that characterize relational contracts.