A government, whose debt is denominated in its own currency, need never face default. In the event of insolvency, created by an unexpected spending need or revenue shortfall, the country can always restore solvency with seigniorage (Sargent and Wallace 1981) and/or debt devaluation through unexpected inflation. Monetary union eliminates these instruments unless the union is willing to sacrifice price stability to restore solvency for an individual country. The European Central Bank has a single mandate of price stability, and no explicit mandate for individual country fiscal solvency.
Founders of the European Monetary Union were concerned that fiscal insolvency could threaten the currency union. They sought to replace the loss of individual-country monetary policy instruments with more prudent fiscal policy by placing limits on debt and the deficit. However, the world-wide financial crisis and recession, which began in 2007 and accelerated in 2008, has had profoundly negative consequences for government budget deficits and debt, with almost all countries in violation of the limits. In 2009 and 2010, interest rates for some countries relative to German rates spiked, reflecting market concern that these countries might default on their debt. What does economic theory have to offer about market concerns that some EMU countries could default?