The prevalence of obesity in American Indian/Alaska Native (AI/AN) populations has increased dramatically over the past 30 years. Although AIs are not a homogeneous group, all tribes throughout the U.S. have suffered adverse effects from the high prevalence of obesity (Story et al, 2000)). Overall, studies demonstrate that obesity begins early for AI/AN children and also is a significant problem for the adult population (IHS, 2001). Many chronic diseases such as type 2 diabetes, heart disease, stroke, arthritis, and breathing problems are associated with the increasing prevalence of obesity in AIs (DHHS, 2001, Story et al, 1999).
The problem of obesity is not unique to AI/ANs. Overweight and obesity have reached epidemic proportions both nationwide and globally (Ogden et al, 2006; Washington, Post, 2006). The existence of these epidemics indicate that in addition to personal responsibility, societal factors such as convenience technology and engineering; food production and marketing patterns; and powerful social and cultural forces that have shaped our communities, our lifestyles and ultimately our bodies play an important role in this problem (McGinnis, 2004).
Government regulation of banks is pervasive, and its rationale stems from two factors: the inherent fragility of banks; and the negative externalities from bank failures. Banks provide liquidity by issuing demand deposits and also act as delegated monitors by making loans to opaque borrowers. This combination of loan-making and deposit-taking makes banks vulnerable to runs, as they finance relatively illiquid loans with liquid demand deposits. Individual bank fragility can, in turn, trigger contagious runs, even on healthy banks, culminating in system-wide failures with a consequent disruption of credit flows to the rest of the economy.
How corporations should manage financial policy to minimize the cost of capital is a question of great theoretical and practical interest. In efficient, integrated, and otherwise perfect capital markets, Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Stiglitz (1974) show that financial policy cannot reduce the cost of capital. Their key insight is that in such idealized markets, the costs of different forms of capital do not vary independently, so there is never any gain to substituting between debt and equity, for example, or between short and long-term debt.
