Geographical wage differentials are large and persistent, despite large migration flows. There are also large geographical differences in welfare benefits, and policy-makers express concerns that these differences might create "welfare magnets" in some locations. We are interested in the extent to which migration flows can be explained by differentials in wages and welfare benefits.
We model individual decisions to migrate as a job search problem in which welfare benefits or other alternative sources of income act as a floor, insuring workers against bad job search outcomes. This differs from the standard job search model in which unemployment benefits are treated as a subsidy received while search continues. In our model, welfare provides a safety net in case the search fails. A worker can draw a wage only by visiting a location, thereby incurring a moving cost. Locations are distinguished by known differences in mean wages, amenity values and alternative income sources. A worker starts the life-cycle in some home location and must determine the optimal sequence of moves before settling down. There is a two-dimensional ranking of locations, ex ante: some places have high mean wages, and others have attractive fallback options (both adjusted for amenity values). In addition we allow for a bias in favor of the home location.