Peters (1989, 1994) of PanAgora Management suggests that, to understand financial turbulence, the dynamics of cash flows between the various market participants, within and between different asset markets, should be analyzed and measured more carefully. Although there exists not yet a complete theory of physical turbulence, let alone a theory of financial turbulence, many parallels between the two phenomena have been noted by, for example, Mandelbrot (1982, 1998).
Simultaneously, the accurate measurement of financial illiquidity and of financial illiquidity risk has gained in importance, as the example of the tax payer financed bail - out of the collapsed Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund in 1998 demonstrates. This hedge fund applied a trading strategy known as convergence arbitrage, which is based on the idea that if two securities have the same theoretical price, because they have the same return risk profile, their market prices should eventually be the same. But this convergence strategy ignores the observation that financial risk is a time dependent phenomenon and not a time - independent phenomenon to which the usual central limit theory based on i.i.d. assumptions applies. Indeed, in the summer of 1998 LTCM made a huge $4 billion loss. This was triggered when Russia defaulted on its debt, which caused a flight to quality in the German bond market.