It is well known that bankruptcy codes–the legal frameworks that govern financial distress and adjudicate the resolution of default on debt contracts–vary substantially across countries. In some countries, such as the UK, the code overwhelmingly favors debtholders, particularly secured debtholders. In others, equityholders are accorded substantial rights. For example, Chapter 11 of the US code allows the firm to suspend interest and principal payments on debt for at least 120 days during which equityholders have the exclusive right to come up with a proposal for reorganization.
The bankruptcy code is evidently itself a leading determinant of the costs of financial distress. As such, one might expect that equity and debt-friendly codes have very different implications for observed capital structures; for example, it appears plausible that “hard” bankruptcy codes (ones that favor debtholders) should lead to lower use of debt. A cross-country study by Rajan and Zingales (1995) offers mixed evidence on this. It finds that at an aggregate level, firms in Germany and the UK (two countries with debt-friendly codes relative to the US) are much less leveraged than US firms. However, the study finds that other G-7 countries too use more leverage than the UK and Germany (and as much or more leverage than the US), though their bankruptcy codes are not as equity-friendly as the US code.