A large body of evidence suggests that credit market frictions play an important role for firm behavior. Empirically, panel data studies find that small firms with more difficult access to credit pay fewer dividends, take on more debt, and have investment rates that are more sensitive to cash flows even after controlling for future profitability. Theoretically, numerous papers show how optimizing models of the firm with incomplete contract enforcement and asymmetric information in the lending process can rationalize the observed correlation of firm size and age with mean growth (negative) and survival rates (positive).
While the relevance of credit market frictions is well established on the microeconomic level, their macroeconomic consequences for business cycle fluctuations are less obvious. Models of financial intermediation and agency costs by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) or Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) imply that the firm’s ability to finance investment varies inversely with the value of its collateral and thus with the business cycle. This financial accelerator mechanism has the potential to generate amplified and persistent output effects in response to small shocks. Yet, simulations in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) context by Kocherlakota (2000), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002), or Petrosky-Nadeau (2005) suggest that for plausible calibrations, credit market frictions of this type alone fail to generate quantitatively important business cycle fluctuations.