When do politicians resort to corrupt practices? This article distinguishes between two types of corruption by politicians: illegal acts for material gain (looting) and illegal acts for electoral gain (cheating). Looting generally involves a politician “selling” influence while cheating involves a politician “buying” votes. We conduct individual-level analyses of new data on financial scandals and election law violations in Japan and show that the determinants of cheating differ from the determinants of looting. Most notably, political experience and electoral security increase the probability of looting, but electoral insecurity combined with intra-party competition increases the probability of cheating. The purpose of elections in a representative democracy is to create a political system in which politicians act in the best interests of those they govern.
Free, fair and competitive elections allow voters the opportunity to both select those whom they believe will govern best, and throw out those who prove to be incompetent or corrupt. If re-election is valued by political leaders, elections create a situation in which “avarice might be a guard upon avarice” (Federalist #72), and corruption may be reduced by the threat that its exposure will cost politicians re-election.
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Political Competition and Corruption in Japan, 1947-1993
