Web-based services have received increasing attention in the last years. The idea is simple: users should be able to send their requests for desired services using a browser, which offers a set of basic functionalities, and receive and view the results at the browser. This allows easy deployment of applications at low cost and without specific user education. Services can be offered by one service provider or several affiliated enterprises. The requirement on such services not to need any special client software is also called zero-footprint. The underlying security services must also be zero-footprint, i.e., only a browser is used for user authentication, and, if desired, for retaining a secure channel with the user, requesting additional security relevant attributes about the users, and potential confirmation by third parties of the authentication of the authentication or attribute information.

The typical approach in other security protocols is to perform a key exchange, based on local master keys, master keys shared with a third party, or public-key certificates, and to subsequently use the exchanged key to secure the communication. A large body of literature on such protocols exist. A seminal paper was [29], although a vulnerability in one of the original protocols was later found in [22]. Tool-supported proofs were initiated in [26, 18, 25], based on abstractions of cryptographic primitives introduced in [8]. Recent tool-supported proofs concentrated on using existing general-purpose model checkers, first in [23, 27, 6], and theorem provers, first in [9, 30]. Cryptographic proofs of key-exchange and authentication protocols were initiated in [1]. Cryptography also added interesting additional properties to pure authentication, e.g., see [20]. Modeling secure channels by a comparison to ideal secure channels, a technique that we will use for the underlying secure channels below, was introduced in [40, 34, 3]. Analyses specifically for SSL and TLS, and thus close to an underlying mechanism used in browsers, were made in [42, 28, 31, 21].

This master's project investigated the capabilities of mobile phones to support 3D graphics for games and how to develop for these devices using the OpenGL ES graphics library. A simple 3D game engine was developed that runs on a PC using a OpenGL ES 2.0 emulator library. Additionally, a game prototype was developed using this engine. The report investigates the differences between PC and mobile games, and how the mobile platform affects the design of a 3D game engine. Furthermore, the differences between OpenGL ES 1.1 and 2.0 are described, covering the implications of developing game graphics with shader programs. In conclusion, mobile phones supporting OpenGL ES 2.0 will be available in 2008 and they will probably support 3D graphics approaching the quality of recent PC games. Developing games for these devices would be very similar to developing PC games. The largest differences relating to graphics are the screen size and memory constraints.

Mobile phones constitute an interesting hardware platform for game developers since so many people always carry a phone around with them. However, mobile phones are generally not specifically designed to support gaming, which poses problems for game developers. One of these problems has been that mobile phones traditionally have provided comparatively simple graphics. This thesis aims to evaluate the graphics capabilities of current and upcoming mobile phones, specifically focused on 3D graphics using the OpenGL ES graphics programming interface. OpenGL ES is an adaptation of the OpenGL industry standard aimed at embedded systems, and is available in two main versions: 1.1 and 2.0. This thesis is mainly focused on the later version which supports more advanced graphical effects through the use of shader programs.

It is widely recognized that the role of corporate IT (Information Technology) has transformed radically over the last decade (see, for example, Hirvonen, 2005). Today it serves not only to support business strategy, but increasingly and more importantly to drive and shape it – and vice versa (Ross, 2003, and Malan and Bredemeyer, 2005). This strategically much more salient role has inspired plenty of both academic and industry effort around the notion of enterprise architecture. Unfortunately, there is no shared definition of enterprise architecture. Malan and Bredemeyer (2005) explain that with the evolution of the notion – “enterprise architecture has evolved during the past decade from enterprise architecture as technology architecture (EA = TA), to enterprise architecture as enterprise-wide IT architecture (EA = EWITA), to enterprise architecture as the architecture of the enterprise, encompassingbusiness architecture along with enterprise-wide IT architecture (EA = BA + EWITA).” Consequently, there are a number of definitions, which differ mainly by their scope. We understand the notion to cover business architecture as well and therefore later on in this work we refer with the term enterprise architecture to its broadest scope.

Nevertheless, Ross (2003) gives an excellent definition of enterprise IT architecture as “the organizing logic for application, data and infrastructure technologies, as captured in a set of policies and technical choices, intended to enable the firm’s business strategy.” Although devised for a some-what narrower scope, we feel that it applies quite nicely for enterprise architecture as well. Furthermore, she defines the objectives of enterprise IT architecture to be identifying IT capabilities, which “specify what the architecture enables the business to do.” These capabilities would include, for example, being able to access specific data for new applications, quickly add channels to existing processes, integrate data from related processes, ensure secure processing for electronic transactions, provide an extended online customer service or replicate systems in new locations (Ross, 2003). Again, we see the definition to apply well for the broader scope, too.

The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is presently the principal tool against biological warfare. 1 As of December 2004, 153 states have ratified or acceded to the convention and another 16 have signed, but not ratified the convention. It encompasses a comprehensive prohibition of preparation for biological warfare. At the heart of the BTWCis Article I, which specifies that states parties cannot acquire or retain biological weapons (BW)under any circumstances. This prohibition is reinforced by the requirement in Article II to destroy or divert all BW to peaceful uses, and by the on-proliferation provision of Article III. By current standards the BTWC is nevertheless a weak treaty because it lacks verification and enforcement mechanisms. There have been some confirmed cases of material breaches and several other allegations of biological warfare and biological weapon (BW) programmes. These have increased the calls to equip the convention with instruments to verify it and enforce compliance. To date efforts to strengthen the BTWCby means of a supplementary legally-binding protocol have failed and the prospects that negotiation of a formal text could resume any time soon are bleak.

Rapid advances in biotechnology and genetic engineering also challenge the future vitality and relevance of the convention. Parties to the BTWC reaffirm the central prohibition in the light of the technological developments during periodic review conferences. However, the failure of the 5th Review Conference in 2001 and at the resumed session in 2002 means that the scope of the norm has not been updated since the 4th Review Conference in 1996. 2 While current biotechnology can be applied to improve the effectiveness of agents or their production processes, the greater concern regards the types of future weapons they may make possible. 3 In this respect, failure of the 6th Review Conference in 2006 would significantly damage the relevance of the convention.