Political Science Ebooks

We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite horizon model of legislative bargaining in which the policy out come in one period determines the status quo in the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities. We prove that all such equilibria are essentially in pure strategies and that proposal strategies are differentiable almost everywhere. The model is general enough to accommodate much of the institutional structure observed in real-world legislatures and parliaments.

Political interaction in modern democracies qualifies as one of the most complex phenomena subjected to scientific inquiry. The need to accommodate this complexity in formal political theory models stems not only from the desire to sate our intellectual curiosity, but seems also essential for the analysis of the effects of public policy and the design of constitutions. In this spirit we seek to develop a class of models of policy making that (i) accounts for the multidimensional nature of public policy, (ii) captures the continuing nature of policy over time, (iii) is rich enough to reflect institutional structure at a fine level of detail, and (iv) allows for the kinds of random shocks (e.g.,on preferences and the social environment) to which political interaction is subjected over time. The political economy literature to date has had limited success in addressing these issues. At a formal level, the primary difficulty that arises is the existence of equilibria in which policy makers use relatively simple and intuitive strategies. Beyond that is the problem of characterizing equilibria, once they are known to exist, and finally there is the task of applying the model, i.e., developing useful special cases and, when the limits of formal analysis are reached, bringing numerical techniques to bear.

We use the principal-agent model as a focal theoretical frame for synthesizing what we know both theoretically and empirically about the design and dynamics of the implementation of performance management systems in the public sector. In this context, we review the growing body of evidence about how performance measurement and incentive systems function in practice and how individuals and organizations respond and adapt to them over time, drawing primarily on examples from performance measurement systems in public education and social welfare programs. We also describe a dynamic framework for performance measurement systems that takes into account strategic behavior of individuals over time, learning about production functions and individual responses, accountability pressures, and the use of information about the relationship of measured performance to value-added. Implications are discussed and recommendations derived for improving public sector performance measurement systems.

The use of formal performance measures based on explicit and objectively defined criteria and metrics has long been a fundamental component of both public and private sector incentive systems. The typical early performance measurement system was based largely on scientific management principles (Taylor, 1911) promoting the careful analysis of workers’ effort, tasks, work arrangements and output, establishing work procedures according to a technical logic, and setting standards and production controls to maximize efficiency. Assuming the benchmark level of performance reflected the relationship between worker effort and output, workers could be paid according to a simple formula that included a base wage per hour plus a bonus rate for performance above the standard.

DNS involves an agreement between actors in a lending and borrowing country to reduce some of the borrowing country’s debt in exchange for the support of a specific environmental project. In 1987, the first debt for nature swap in the world occurred between Bolivia and Conservation International. It involved the cancellation of $650,000 Bolivian foreign debt in exchange for $100,000 of local currency to be used towards protection of the Bolivian Beni Biosphere. In recent years, the number of private debt-for-nature swaps (DNS) in 3rd World countries has been increasing rapidly.

Debt-for-nature swaps have been described as a deal where everyone benefits: indebted countries receive debt relief and environmental conservation organizations receive funding for conservation projects. DNS is an important issue because it could potentially be a useful tool in development strategy, but do DNS agreements really benefit all of the parties involved? There is a considerable gap in the research on the impact these deals have on the people living in the communities in/around the impacted environmental areas. The majority of the research available to the public is largely in favor of DNS. At the same time, the information presented is often overly-simplistic. This paper argues that the impact and mechanisms of DNS are more complicated and require more detailed analysis before any conclusion should be reached about the potential benefits and use of the debt-for-nature swap.

Johnston describes political corruption as “the abuse of public roles or resources for private benefit”. Definitions of the terms ‘abuse’, ‘public’, ‘private’ and ‘benefit’ are crucial when applying this definition to a country specific analysis of corruption but in Russia, rapid liberalisation means that the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ is blurred. Difficulties identifying ‘abuse’ are hindering the development of effective anti-corruption strategies in Russia. Consequently, corruption has become a “universal condition of life” (Bocharov, 2001, p.38). However, this is seriously distorting Russia’s political, economic and social development. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, all of the Presidents of Russia have stated their commitment to combating corruption in the public sphere. However, neither Yeltsin nor Putin were able to make significant progress in this respect.

In 2008 President Medvedev revealed his National Anti-Corruption Plan as the first comprehensive and systematic response to corruption in Russia. This dissertation seeks to evaluate the potential for success of Medvedev’s Plan and to propose a number of measures for remedying its weaknesses. In order to do so, this dissertation will begin by explaining what is meant by ‘political corruption’ in Russia. It will be argued that weak institutions, poorly enforced regulations and a lack of civil involvement are sustaining weak understandings of public- and private- sector roles, and that this is facilitating corrupt activity throughout Russia’s official institutions. It will be asserted that, in order to clarify the boundaries between the public and private spheres, Russia needs to do five things: increase transparency and accountability in all levels of government; improve legislative sanctions against corrupt behaviour; establish incentives for good behaviour; facilitate a credible privatisation process; and strengthen civil society.